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ABSTRACT
This article offers a perspective on the debate about experts and their value. It consid-
ers why expert claims for attention are often regarded as suspect. It does so by reflect-
ing on the work of Arendt, Oakeshott, and Scruton. It notes that decision makers can 
easily find themselves in a bind - sometimes railing against experts, like those 
presumed to inhabit an education ‘Blob’ in the UK - and at other times seemingly 
becoming dependent upon them, as in ‘the Science’ and public health. It draws atten-
tion to the character of the distaste for scepticism about experts within education, and 
to the intellectual origin of that scepticism itself. It highlights the alleged contradic-
tions in the minds of sceptics especially where they want to conserve or draw strength 
from inherited social norms, and yet at the same time regard them as a dehumanising 
trap. It suggests that the contradiction can be overcome by distinguishing between 
their concerns about the dangers of rationalism, and their rooted attachment to reason 
and reasonableness. It invites practitioners to take a principled interest in risk and in 
its resistance to elimination. It suggests that ridicule can be healthy in so far as it 
deftly challenges complacency amongst experts and practitioners alike.
EXPERTS, STATUS, AND POWER
Dismissing experts without discriminating judgment, and regardless of their 
quality, is plainly as misguided as according them some special standing without 
rigorous scrutiny. Yet keeping a sense of proportion about their worth is often 
hard. This is especially so when they are either demonised as politically inspired 
propagandists, or alternatively used as weapons against the darker versions of 
denier populism – whether actual or merely claimed. This isn’t easy for either 
practitioners or publics. The balanced position is desirably sceptical – neither 
wilfully suspicious, nor readily awed, and always searching. It will be unafraid of 
teasing good humour. Whilst sceptics will oppose rationalist attachments, they 
will always look to calibrate the value of particular experts, and their evidence, 
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forensically. They will be reluctant to adopt generalised conclusions and will not 
be disposed to put reason and reasonableness at risk. They will not allow their 
scepticism to become so promiscuous as to slip into treating bad arguments just as 
though they might be good.
Anyhow, here are a few questions, the answers to which will lead us to the 
important work of Arendt, Oakeshott, and Scruton. First, why do some practitioners 
fulminate against criticism of experts by politicians like Michael Gove in the first 
place? In part, it is because it is assumed that the public treats the title of expert as 
automatically worthy of attention and respect. An expert knows what counts when 
others don’t; shows what to do, and what not to do; and has the capacity to resolve 
tough problems. It is assumed that the expert will invariably affect the inexpert or 
untutored positively – thus gaining sufficient superiority to command power, 
reputational dignity, and remunerative acclamation. To disparage experts is then 
held to be dangerously irrational, and populist too where the term is applied to 
everything of which I disapprove; whose origins I am unwilling to confront; and 
whose human concerns I refuse to understand or tackle.
Most people prefer to feel respected, whether in reality they are or not. Where 
educators persuade themselves that they are not heard, or are somehow 
undervalued, or not trusted, or otherwise deserve some special advantage, they 
join a scramble for verbal tags like ‘expert’ to bolster their status against that of 
others. They do so whether there is evidence that its achievement would have any 
beneficial consequence for learners or not. They treat the epithet ‘expert’ or 
‘researcher’ as a tradeable commodity – a form of frantic credentialism deployed 
in a struggle for public profile and resource advantage. People who want to be 
heard are often not listening.
Any sceptical critic, who is nonetheless sympathetic to the practice of teaching, 
will regard the title ‘expert’ as a tricky term to which the unnecessarily 
underconfident aspire. It is imperious in outlook – unlike the more modest terms 
‘specialist’, or ‘exemplar of a craft’ like acting or leadership. It has the potential to 
farm value whether justified or not. Yet a profession does not alone make the 
practitioner an expert. In so far as educators seek to give the impression that they 
are all possessed of expert capabilities, and in the same degree, they do themselves, 
and those they serve, no credit. Their position is merely self-regarding. In an open 
society, providers cannot reasonably dictate the grant of social kudos. Wanting the 
respect presumed of other professions is no basis for developing your own.
PRACTICE AND PRIVILEGE
Second, why do some react adversely to any challenge to experts in communities 
of practice? They do so, again in part, because they sense that sceptics see these 
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communities as protective opinion networks. In this they are not wrong. If you 
claim to be expert you enter into communion with colleagues in a self-sustaining 
bubble designed for mutual reputational gain – an elite that has the strength to 
exclude as well as to influence ‘ordinary’ minds. Joining such a collective offers 
the prospect of adding lustre to a practitioner’s own standing simply by associa-
tion. It makes it easier to live in comfort with your own prejudices, opinions, and 
beliefs. It carries the risk of becoming less inclined to reflect, think and be subject 
to credible evidential review. Those ‘others’ outside the defensive carapace may be 
treated as ignorant, stupid or deplorable. Their tastes offend and agonise the elite.
None of this is surprising given the prevailing cultural preference (at least in 
the West) for incontinent emotionalism; divisive identity-mongering; witless 
‘passion’; and greedy self-realisation, as opposed to public duty. Overall, the 
sceptic will always be on the alert for the temper of easy comfort in an expert – the 
sort that is regressive, complacent, slovenly, and very far from radical. As always, 
self-pride and personal passion risk walking with privilege in ways wholly removed 
from the humble, dispassionate, and respectful.
If the title of expert is claimed, then it surely must be earned. It must have 
demonstrable effect and be free of any post-modernist disinclination to take truth 
seriously. The title cannot simply be appropriated as something justifying 
permanent attribution. It isn’t gained just because a practitioner works hard, spends 
time and effort in a particular field, and feels entitled to recognition. Sharing a 
disposition derived from mutually reinforcing exchanges untroubled by rigorous 
scrutiny is common, but not the mark of genuine expertise. The expert must expect 
to be tested and to face contradiction – or otherwise risk redundancy.
The collisions of experts and sceptics arise from other directions too. Thus, 
educators and decision-makers in the UK often view one another with profound 
perplexity. Many educators can seem resistant to proposals for change unless they 
conform to ‘what teachers want’, as though that were readily identifiable, 
professionally motivated (as opposed to Union or employment driven), and capable 
of cutting through to public consciousness. From this optic, change and 
improvement face a professional mind-set that appears wedded to operational 
overcomplication and risk aversion. It is easy to dismiss.
It does not help when practitioners give little or no credit for the very 
considerable increases in taxpayer funding devoted to education whatever the 
colour of the central government administration over at least two decades. 
However, for their part, and in their own version of a private world, policy makers 
can appear to give scant consideration to the distinctive motivators amongst 
practitioners in schools, FE and Universities; to the physically and intellectually 
demanding character of their roles; to the complexity of the environments in which 
they operate; and to the rigours of development within, and for, professional lives.
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Where social deference has all but evaporated; society has become greatly 
more open and diverse; and the (un)social media rule, public expectations of 
educators and education increase exponentially – and it becomes ever harder to 
meet them. Actually, the same difficulty confronts elected politicians. Policy 
ambitions collide so that, for example, the scope for de-centralising decisions 
about resource allocation and use on the one hand, cannot be reconciled with 
vehement opposition to any ‘postcode lottery’ on the other.
PERCEPTION, RESEARCH, POLICY, AND ‘THE BLOB’
In so fluid a context, it would be useful if research, and the associated experts, 
were in good standing. So, do the products of ‘expert’ educational research 
command attention and respect? HE offers much that is distinguished. UK educa-
tion departments mine data from the OECD, inspectorates, and awarding bodies 
extensively. Practitioner leadership is increasing. Yet sadly, and in general, the 
record is mixed. The absence of educational institutions like the Royal Colleges in 
medicine enfeebles liaison between research, policy, and practitioner. Results are 
often presented in drearily inaccessible language, ideologically disconnected from 
political reality. They feature matters of no evident relevance to learners or other-
wise offer insights too late to affect policy at all. Efforts are repeatedly made to 
tackle this, but facing adverse perception squarely is at least a stimulus to raising 
the game.
That also means recognising that policy-makers may perceive the tone of 
educational research as statist or welfarist – keener on paralysing distractions than 
on seeking solutions to tough problems, and resistant to numerical analysis too. In 
parallel, sceptics will always deprecate research suggestive of profound insight 
which merely promotes a cosy mood of lofty cynicism. They will reject pathways 
to ‘fair’ outcomes from positions which ignore conflicting interpretations of what 
counts as fair, or contradictions in other concepts implicit in notions of social 
justice. Too often research gives the impression that social good can only be 
achieved by a monoculture of central and local government. Too often social 
mobility is cast as solely for the academically competent – a form of ‘fairness’ that 
kicks away the ladder to recognition, dignity and advancement for those with 
different attributes.
For critical sceptics, educational initiatives or outcomes can never be wholly 
equitable – whether by reference to systems, organisations or some abstract ideal 
standard. For them, equitable outcomes can only be achieved by suppressing 
innovation, individuality, opportunity, and diversity of institutional provision. So, 
sceptics disparage any tendency amongst educators to bewail intrusions into what 
teachers teach, and how they teach, as though there were no professional or public 
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interest in how learning or best practice is promoted and different merits 
recognised. Practitioners and researchers may argue that the history of post-war 
education policy in the UK exhibits a preference for raw market ideology and a 
denial of social welfare and well-being. However, for the sceptic, the argument is 
simply unsustainable: alternative policy prescriptions are either absent, biased to 
the academic, inchoate, or electorally untenable.
In any event, public policy towards education in the UK has featured a clear 
direction of travel over three decades and the results have been far from unfruitful. 
Teachers are not yet required to indoctrinate or to tell learners precisely what to 
think. The public expect that they will act on a vocational commitment to help young 
people to learn and live well whatever the circumstances they face. All UK 
governments want practitioners to improve the value generated from taxpayer 
funding in the interests of the economy, society, and individuals. Certainly, sceptics 
would not accept that the solution to all the ills facing educators – whether real or 
imagined; whether relating to the condition of capitalism; to COVID; to the 
‘supremacist patriarchy’; or species extinction – can be dealt with by holistic 
transformation, or anything which elevates educational priorities ahead of any others.
Sceptics will always emphasise that the fragility implicit in the social 
construction of expert educational research inevitably risks a negative mind set – 
at the extreme, that of a turgid ‘Blob’. And this is what famously exercised Michael 
Gove, and attendant Special Advisers (Montrose42 Blog 2013). He applied the 
label to a group of 100 academics as ‘enemies of promise’ – a term used by Cyril 
Connolly (1948). A natural sceptic, Gove saw the sociology of much educational 
research as fuelling disappointment, and resistant to change and challenge.
More broadly sceptics point up that where people feel especially threatened, 
by nuclear or climate annihilation, pandemic or economic collapse or anything 
else, they cry out for certainties. They seek complete safety or protection from 
risk, and expect that experts will deliver. Treating experts this way typically 
concedes ground to powerful institutional and personal authority. In turbulent 
times, the outsider, critic, or troublesome sceptic will always face hostility, a 
clamour for national safety, and for urgent expedients (regardless of unintended 
results). Yet their voices are critical to preserving the very openness of mind, trade 
and society that offers the best prospect of innovating and confronting significant 
threats successfully. That is so, providing that the balance between winners and 
losers is not lost in the transition (something instinctive liberals can easily 
overlook).
Moreover, a longing for certainty and timid deference to the expert walks hand 
in hand with casual derision for those who have to grapple with risk, confusion 
and despair. Sceptics will reserve special disapprobation for those who never risk 
themselves at the ballot box, yet who are determined to assert that leading 
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politicians of whatever party are anti-teacher. Whatever else they do; politicians 
do not court the disapproval of whole professions.
In fact, activist Ministers like Kenneth Baker under Margaret Thatcher in the 
late 80s, David Blunkett under Tony Blair in the late 90s, and Michael Gove under 
David Cameron in the early 20s have all sought to extend the reach of educators 
and enable them to promote higher standards and learners’ personal fulfilment. So 
too have the overwhelming majority of education Ministers and regulators in 
central and devolved government – and politicians in local government too. It may 
be that for some, these achievements can never be regarded as well-founded or 
worth having because ideologically unsound. But that is largely meretricious and 
tendentious posturing – a propaganda of evasion and contempt.
The record of respect for educators can be read in long lists. Here is one: the 
entitlements created for learners through the national curriculum; the associated 
and serious attention given to assessment; the efforts to provide school leaders with 
greater autonomy over policy and budgets; the use of targets to raise expectations; 
the ramping up of funding per pupil; the major increase in teacher numbers; the 
efforts to reduce class sizes; the great increase in teacher pay; the expansion of the 
academies programme and the introduction of free schools (in England); the efforts 
to broaden options to recognise and to equip learners to navigate an uncertain 
world; the determination to achieve greater rigour in examination and qualification 
design; and the willingness to promote teaching as a regulated profession.
This is not the whole story, and not everything has been an immediate 
success – or ever could have been. However, from the perspectives of many policy 
makers, and politicians of both left and right, every effort to improve and reform 
has been met by resistance from apparently ‘expert’ educators. In acrimony, 
practitioners cry, ‘Get off my back, but tell me precisely what to do’. Thus, Michael 
Gove’s use of the ‘Blob’ label gave expression to the frustrations of policy makers 
about the perceived inclinations of some teaching Unions, local authorities, 
academics, and some educators to act as a drag on constructive improvement. He 
wasn’t the originator of the term, and those who use it consider it to be wholly 
undeserving of outrage. That said, it is worth responding to ridicule by explaining 
why it is unjustified, in so far as it may be, in ways that are compelling and 
command general public respect. Unfortunately, or fortunately, no such response 
has so far been especially audible.
EXPERTS, INDEPENDENCE, POLICY MAKING, AND MYTH
Next, is there a credible and substantial challenge to scepticism – something that 
goes beyond the observation that criticism of the expert can be taken just too far, 
and even to indiscriminate stereotyping or the lunacies of conspiracy mania? This 
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line might well have some justified traction given the evidence for dysfunctional 
relationships between researchers, experts, specialists and decision makers within 
the UK governmental system.
Aside from Michael Gove’s (2020) recent remarks on the performance of the 
British civil service, anyone who has the patience to read the reports of the National 
Audit Office (and the parallel organisations for the devolved governments) cannot 
but be overwhelmed by the post-war litany of disasters in public policy-making 
within the UK (King and Crew 2013). They feature incompetent change and 
project management; insouciance about risk management; woefully inadequate 
procurement practice; and waste on an epic scale. They do not encourage 
confidence that tax will be well used, whether governments raise more or less.
From the misuse of intelligence prior to the invasion of Iraq under Blair; to the 
treatment of immigration from EU accession states early in the millennium; to 
failed financial regulation under Brown; to the confusions over policy towards the 
EU under Cameron and May; to the struggle to achieve a coherent response to 
COVID-19 under Johnson, the truly troubling factor has lain not only in the 
weakness of expert advice, but in the inability of professional specialists and 
decision makers to achieve reliable judgment, purpose, and action.
So, a concern about scepticism towards experts might be justified if it gets in 
the way of responding to the immense pressures for timely decision in massively 
contested public landscapes where the chances of mis-step carry the highest of 
stakes. Experts, practitioners, and decision makers share responsibility for public 
policy outcomes. The character of that relationship would be transformed if its 
features were more thoroughly transparent and the lessons of failure more 
determinedly learned. Following O’Neill (2017), experts and decision makers 
alike might reflect that it would be useful to overcome mutual incomprehension 
and suspicion by working on their relationships. That would entail a shift from a 
simplistic demand to be accorded trust, to the mutual and disciplined cultivation 
of trustworthiness.
Yet it is not at all obvious that the relationship can improve without the 
sharpness of scorn that draws attention to the differences of perspective in the first 
place. Indeed, it is hard to withhold ridicule from one particular line of argument. 
This comes from those who consider that an expert generally has a claim to 
reliability. Distrusting democracy, they will often argue that the very quality of 
expertise makes the case for detaching problems of public policy from politics 
altogether. It is often said that educational practice and policy would best be 
carried out ‘independently’ of government (whether central, local, or devolved) on 
terms mimicking arrangements that currently apply for the health service in 
England or the Bank of England – in so far as they are likely to last, which can 
hardly be assumed.
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Thus, it is claimed that teachers of history are assessors of events not historians 
for government; that all educational experts should practise in the same mould; 
and that the institutions of government should preserve the distinction. At the 
same time, it is implied that if decision-makers were all expert educators, public 
benefit would be guaranteed. The suggestion glides easily into arguments in favour 
of bringing practitioners into policy-making roles within government departments, 
or likewise experienced specialists capable of working on particular problems or 
techniques without preconceptions. These are usually valid, and generally useful 
initiatives. They do not give rise to the same issues as those attaching to 
presumptions about experts and expertise. Nor do they address the besetting 
disconnection between policy making and practical implementation in the UK.
The policy problems confronting democratic government are rarely, if ever, 
patient of treatment from one professional perspective alone. Trade-offs abound. 
Someone may command respect as an expert in one field and people may assume 
it to be reliable for others. But this is usually a mistake - a form of transference 
when the public pressure for solutions and certainty is overwhelming. Moreover, 
the skills needed in educational settings and related research are not the same as 
those needed in government. It is not that they cannot be transferred in either 
direction it is simply that the capability differences, and the difficulties of adapting 
them to unfamiliar contexts, need to be recognised frankly.
Moreover, attempts to claim that policy is led by ‘the Science’ in the COVID-19 
pandemic have again exposed the awkward reality that experts frequently and 
profoundly disagree. They did so about what could be said to be known about the 
virus and what not; about transmission dosage; immunity; treatment, and 
protection. More substantially, although lockdown was ultimately preferred to 
herd immunity in March 2020, judgments about the implications of operational 
damage to the NHS, and to the wider economy, could not be made in isolation 
from one another. Even where experts agree, it does not follow that the public will 
regard their judgments as legitimate or even tolerable. Ultimately, multiple and 
conflicting pressures are inescapably for governmental decision even though this 
should desirably be achieved on terms that are non-binary as between expert and 
politician.
‘The Science’ is not an institution capable of achieving legitimate and effective 
governmental decision. It merely refers to contributors to decision making. Civil 
servants are no longer the sole conduits for advice to Ministers. Rather they ensure 
that Ministers are fully advised and can take account the competing voices 
clamouring for attention – expert or not. Indeed, in the UK, no state or devolved 
education department exists to protect the interests of educators and education 
where circumstances and priorities determine otherwise. An independent cadre of 
expert educationalists would never command legitimacy for acutely difficult 
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decisions which ultimately demand balanced judgments of practical as well as 
political risk. To assert otherwise is to indulge disingenuity and myth.
Moreover, decision by unelected experts is no more defensible than decision 
by unelected bureaucrats. Claiming the right to steer decision on the basis of 
some expertise or other without being troubled by plural voices; getting it wrong; 
grandstanding for personal reputational effect; and then sneering at politicians 
when they take the tough decisions, is hardly defensible either. This is 
emphatically not to say that experts or specialists have no role in policy 
formation, only that they cannot claim to exclude diverse voices and needs, or 
that their assessments are absolute and invariably reliable. Experts cannot 
monopolise judgment. Sceptical detachment and pragmatism are the only sound 
bases for government.
EXPERTS, TRUST, AND THE LAW
By way of further illustration consider the GCSE and A Level grade awards for in 
2020. Every relevant ministry in the UK (Conservative; SNP in Scotland; Labour/
LibDem in Wales; DUP/SF in Northern Ireland, and associated qualification regu-
lators) adopted arrangements for balancing teacher assessment with moderation 
prior to August 2020, and then abandoned them within hours. One reading of what 
happened (only one) is that the expert regulators were reluctant to drop an estab-
lished preference for socially distanced examinations at the moment when the 
concerns of teachers and parents made them unsustainable.
The regulators also failed to devise an award and appeal process that might be 
saleable for whole cohorts but could never command public credibility at the level 
of some individual schools or students. The wholesale abandonment apparently 
occurred regardless of the risks for higher education, grade inflation, employer 
decisions, and also for successor learners in 2021. Given that this sort of 
interpretation of events has gained traction, and quickly, the public can hardly be 
expected to trust education experts without equivocation.
In any event, pure professional autonomy simply does not exist – not even for 
judicial activists. It is always bounded. Whether education is publicly funded, 
directly or indirectly, or privately financed, it has necessarily to be moderated by 
disciplines of accountability that are intrinsic to professional effectiveness and 
legitimacy. The claim, trust me I’m a teacher and an expert whose marking can 
relied upon, will ultimately cut no ice with governments and the public (whatever 
assessment arrangements are determined for 2021 and beyond) when teachers’ 
commitments to their learners leave them fundamentally conflicted. Few would 
tolerate a lawyer to be judge and jury in a client’s own cause. Only the wilfully 
obtuse would be content with a static marking system permitting neither upward 
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pressure on examination and assessment standards over time, nor any policy 
towards grade inflation.
Furthermore, much suspicion of ‘expert’ opinion arises because it is often 
generated not by experts at all, but by individuals working in organisations funded 
by special interests determined to muster political pressure for particular results. 
Very obviously, competing, and often lurid, expert claims marked the referendum 
campaigns on Scottish independence and departure from the EU. Creating 
narratives aimed at changing attitudes in mass populations, coupled with activities 
designed to spark sympathy for related goal achievement, is their stock in trade. It 
is assisted by lazy journalism. They may simply be ‘sock puppets’ serving 
unaccountable money focused on policy positioning and media management. They 
may be charitable bodies cynically disinclined to let public paranoia go to waste 
and using it as a fundraising lever. They may be client entities masquerading as 
independent, yet supporting government policy in exchange for public funding. 
They are evident where political systems are emergent, or under strain. Following 
Gove (2017), these are perhaps the kind of experts of which the public might have 
had ‘enough’.
Whilst it is claimed that policy should be evidence ‘based’ or ‘informed’, this 
may covertly disregard problems of origin, cogency and quality. Indeed, the 
pressure for ‘impact’ in academia or think-tanks may itself act as a distraction 
from evidential frailty. Thus, COVID epidemiological modelling was not early 
subject to full multi-disciplinary review. ‘Publish or perish’ may favour media 
profile over rigorous research or scholarship. Notwithstanding the disparate 
mechanisms designed to promote good practice, there is no one Academy of 
Experts for education as for some Court experts; no advance training; no relevant 
duty in Teachers Standards (DfE England 2017); no performance monitoring; and 
no disclosure requirements. So, expert claims can evade review. This matters. 
Much educational research uses interpretivist method which, in the hands of the 
incautious, and despite its strengths, is vulnerable to misplaced inference, evasive 
treatment of correlation, and inflated conclusions.
In the UK, the law (1975; 2012) distinguishes between ordinary witnesses who 
often find it difficult to distinguish fact from inference, and an expert having the 
specialist knowledge to give an informed opinion on evidence put before the 
Court. Experts have power. Accordingly, the Courts are bound to test the depth 
and quality of the knowledge claimed; its relevance; its reliability; and whether it 
is fair to admit that opinion. The function – indeed the duty - of the expert before 
the Courts is to present information that is likely to be outside the experience of 
judge or jury. It must be evidence which helps the Court to reach its own 
independent conclusions. Governments, parliaments, and publics have an 
analogous need.
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Neither Government nor Court is bound by expert evidence. The fact that an 
expert has impressive qualifications does not automatically make his or her opinion 
any more helpful than that of judge or jurors themselves: although, in the caustic 
observation of one authority, there is a danger that the expert may think it does. 
Expert evidence may be ruled inadmissible where it is neither objective nor 
impartial. Experts have a duty to be unbiased. There must be a reliable body of 
knowledge to underpin the evidence they give and they must not testify beyond 
their expertise. They must not overstate their knowledge, make improper inferences, 
misstate uncertainty, or misrepresent the methods by which ‘expert’ information 
was obtained, and so mislead the Court. They must not evade proper disclosure of 
sources. They must not use loose language, nor indulge in speculative opinion.
These are high bars for conduct in the political domain. However, the frequency 
with which they are not met, and the limited penalties for failure, make it inevitable 
that scepticism about expert claims will inevitably arise. Its strength will depend 
on just how far experts fall short of the Courts’ standards and those expected in 
public life. No one would expect every expert should be under some absolute or 
statutory obligation to assist the government to come to conclusions on any matter. 
But nor should they be protected from assessment against the Seven Principles of 
Public Life (the ‘Nolan’ Principles) if they do, or do not.
These principles have been current since 1995; Selflessness; Honesty; 
Objectivity; Accountability; Leadership; Integrity; and Openness and should be 
evident in every educational researcher’s practice. They are also integral to 
defining the educator’s function to sustain the public interest. That includes putting 
the needs of learners first; maintaining standards and quality; and upholding 
professional reputation. All these principles are critical to any claim to be 
professional, and to evaluating expert opinion in education or anything else. 
Politicians and the wider public will use them, and it is to be expected that their 
application should, and will, reveal practice that is less than satisfactory and 
undeserving of respect.
LANGUAGE, RATIONALISM, AND PERFECTION
Some words do seem to act as cat nip for some commentators and practitioners. 
That is perhaps to be expected given that education policy occupies heavily 
contested political territory. For example, some express a loathing for Margaret 
Thatcher’s remark that there is ‘no such thing as society’. This is regardless of the 
words she actually used (1987) which stressed the importance of  personal human 
agency and social engagement. Others detest the term ‘Blob’ as applied to some 
‘expert’ educationalists without thinking of its nuanced substance. It is always 
worth pausing to assess why these kinds of words excite attention.
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One way of doing this is by considering the work of Hannah Arendt, Michael 
Oakeshott, and Roger Scruton. All three would resist conventional labels of left or 
right. They might better be called penetrating contrarians, but that is not adequate 
either. All three had firm attachments to the notion of society and community 
whilst simultaneously being critical of their flaws. All three drew attention to the 
progenitors of violence, especially when confronting the horrors of anti-Semitism, 
Nazism and Communism. Their careers took them variously to Princeton, LSE, 
Birkbeck, and Buckingham. They remind us that sceptical misgivings about 
group-think and confirmation bias have a lengthy pedigree.
Ideas of societal progress and perfectibility are ever with us. Caution about 
them always rankles with those who see their lives as being not just about 
contributing to social cohesion, but to actually achieving an ideal-type of social 
progress – demolishing social barriers to mobility and change in favour of 
communitarian objectives. From many standpoints those may have honourable 
and vivid features. However, their treatment in the political domain can readily 
become perverse and highly volatile – disregarding the complexities of rights, 
justice, and ethical judgment. Sceptics pay attention to this. They express 
reservations about our capacity to handle them peaceably in ways that are practical 
and politically adroit. They reject sentimental optimism as being inimical to the 
requirements of effectively functioning open, and democratic, political systems.
The roots of this caution lie in reactions to the enlightenment during the 
eighteenth century. When asked what he thought of the French Revolution, Mao 
Tse Tung may famously have remarked that it was too soon to say. It is hardly too 
soon now. Some of its features involved a violent attack on conventional tradition 
and religion and were linked to beliefs in the possibility of human perfectibility 
and in the achievement of an ideal society. Progress mattered above all, however 
defined. For Robespierre nothing could be allowed to get in the way of ‘The 
Republic of Virtue’. The guillotine had a cleansing function, and a bloody one.
So, the ‘enlightenment’ certainly had its dark side. Himmelfarb (2008) gives a 
graphic analysis of the consequences. If terror was needed to get results, then so be 
it. Speaking of education and reflecting Rousseau’s injunction to change human 
nature and transform each and every individual come what may, Robespierre 
commented of schools, ‘I am convinced of the necessity of bringing about a complete 
regeneration, and, if I may express myself so, of creating a new people.’ The reign 
of virtue for Rousseau would make ‘particular wills’ conform to the ‘general will’ 
without making clear what this sublimation of the individual would actually entail, 
and what constraints would exist on its exercise. In this there is ‘virtue signalling’ on 
steroids – uncritical, unreflective, self-righteous, and ultimately brutal.
Rationalism of this kind – determined to bend the world to a tidy, consistent, 
uniformity – is a perversion of reason and reasonableness. It seeks to mimic the 
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eternity of a Kingdom of God on earth. As Cohn (1970) shows it is not something 
that can be wholly detached from the history of millennium cults of all forms that 
have erupted in the West from time to time before the eighteenth century – and, 
one might add, since.
In Britain, the reaction to the Revolution was complex, but ultimately a 
preference for adaptive evolution won out over radical dislocation, as Burke (2014) 
urged, it should. It was cemented culturally by various forms of religious revivalism 
and charitable benevolence. By contrast the American Revolution was marked by 
the collective intellectual effort of the Republic’s Founders: they valued freedom 
above all partly because they had sought religious liberty by leaving Europe in the 
first place. The realities of power in all three settings were not unmarked by 
ugliness, but in broad terms, and in both Britain and America, there emerged a 
political culture preferring the empirical and practical over the deductive and 
dogmatic. Rationalism remains unconscionable for those who are not easily 
labelled left or right, but who are sceptics by temper and in judgment.
ARENDT, MOBILISATION, AND TERROR
For Arendt (1958) in particular, societies and communities of whatever sort are 
both an inevitable historical necessity and a potential trap. Humanity needs social 
engagement but can also be ensnared and perverted by it. She is especially fluent 
on the pathways to totalitarian tyranny, terror and autocracy that rest on the foun-
dations of presumed virtue and an itch for rationalist social design. She claims that 
under conditions of extensive disruption and discontinuity ‘..Society always 
demands that its members act as though they were members of one enormous 
family which has only one opinion and interest.’
For her, times of profound change and dislocation threaten to liquidate humane 
public and private realms and to replace them with a specious equality – a 
conformity risk intrinsic to damaging any society. At the extreme it features 
disorientated mass mobilisation in which human agency falls into apathetic 
servitude to consumption, technology, or terror. It is a social construct that 
inveigles humanity to abandon the agency to create public and private spaces and 
their protections, including private property. It demands that they be replaced with 
forms of conduct and government that risk the extinction of all humane impulses. 
For her, socialised mankind risks that state of society where prosperity ‘…feeds 
not on the abundance of material goods but on the process of production and 
consumption itself’.
Those who claim to have answers to fearful uncertainty, and to command 
progress, set up a notion of society that tends to become devouring, all embracing, 
controlling, rule obsessed and exclusive. Left alone it has the capacity to suck 
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people into compliance; to dehumanise; to suppress truth and to mobilise poison 
and propaganda. The guardians of public safety make sure that their interests 
prevail: the rest experience a collective Stockholm Syndrome. Lest it be thought 
that Arendt’s risk assessment was misplaced, consider the millions of deaths from 
the Long March in China; the holocaust of the Jews in Nazi Germany; the murder 
of tens of millions in Soviet Russia; the equally savage outcome of the invasion of 
China by Japan in the 1930s; the genocide in Rwanda – and more besides.
Yet at the heart of her thinking there remained a seeming contradiction. She 
was against personalising emotion and introspection. She asserted that human 
relationships become real only in action; in the exercise of freedom; and in the 
determination to create or preserve public space where reason and reasonableness 
can flourish. She didn’t think that relationships grow naturally, but rather that they 
are constructed actively by individuals. On the one hand, she did not consider that 
a web of relationships could be challenged without the norms, customs, and 
standards that make a civilisation: on the other, she saw those same features as 
overwhelmingly threatening to human intervention and creativity.
Pitkin (1998) makes this contradiction explicit, and she is critical of it. It is she 
who first described Arendt’s distaste for the risks of appropriation by the social as 
being analogous to absorption by ‘the Blob’. She suggests that Arendt’s asperity is 
larded with the language of science-fiction. The ‘social’ becomes ridiculed as an 
attacking entity from outer space like that featured in a 1950s film itself called 
‘The Blob’. Pitkin’s criticism rests on conflating Arendt’s critique of rationalism 
with reason. She teases in ways that question the force of what Arendt had to say, 
whilst simultaneously respecting most of it. Gove simply follows Arendt.
Overall, sceptics see rationalism is the high-road to absolutism, responding to 
a craving for certainty (especially from experts). It aspires to total social 
re-formation, regardless of the implications for individual persons and those they 
love. However, it is through reason, reasonableness, and moderation in the public 
space, that what exists can be challenged. It is by applying them that what is can 
be reconciled with what ought or might be. Rationalism suppresses our capacity to 
make balanced judgment. Reason in action, by contrast, rejects a closed society 
that represses freedom, and cancels persons. It rejects the vilification of what is 
reasonably thought, written, and said, or of indifference to received opinion. 
McWhorter has recently written movingly of the dreadful alternatives (2020).
Still, perfectibility and rationalism remain in fashion, almost as echoes of 
‘divine right’. This is not just in the West: the Chinese Communist Party expresses 
the same repressive impulse – a denial of reason or the capacity to exercise 
reasonable decision for the endlessly variable circumstances of experience. It 
assumes that everything is always related to everything else; that no discontinuities 
exist or can occur; that no subtle discrimination of judgment is tolerable; that 
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attachments to abstract terms of sustainability, precaution; intersectionality, and 
proportionality will have no unintended consequences and carry no risk.
All this is prompted by one reading of Arendt. There are others. She resists 
easy interpretation. However, it seems safe to assert that for her the ultimate risk 
implicit in unyielding pre-occupations with ‘society’ involves sliding into a denial 
of reason and reasonableness to substitute totemic rationalism instead – into the 
risk of promoting perverted and horrific outcomes. It is necessarily authoritarian 
in enforcing cultural alignment. It insists on conformity with a transformative 
project animated by slogans and an impatience for truth. It is accompanied by 
active mobilisation of mobs. As Marcel as it, the person’s ontological existence is 
removed from being, and is transferred to being had (1945).
OAKESHOTT, SCRUTON, HABIT, AND ‘THE BLOB’
Oakeshott’s work (1967) often appears in harmony with Arendt’s own. Like her he 
walks the line between warning against treating society as an idol, whilst also 
pointing to the significance of informal, free, and even traditional commitments of 
human engagement. He stresses the value of our ‘discovering’ habits – like toler-
ance and enjoyment – rather than thrusting precepts at others. He treats rational-
ism as something imposed ‘top-down’, obsessed by preferences for dreams, for 
statute as opposed to common law, for regulations, and for adherence to powerful 
elite or expert opinion.
Like Arendt he would regard a passion for experts as simply naïve and 
egotistical. He implies that the voice that insists on only one judgement as to virtue 
is the voice of the fanatic that rejects the lessons of experience and inheritance. It 
treats the past as servant of the present. It requires standards of stewardship for the 
future that are detached from practical present realities. It is endlessly exhausting 
in pretending to be incontrovertible. It places no value on agile adaptability; 
resilience; integrity; or on diversity of thought, opinion, and belief for the 
management of risk. It dispenses with the very conditions of openness, reason, and 
orderly rules for decision-making that create the space for spontaneity, 
technological innovation, and creativity necessary to resolve practical problems.
For Oakeshott (1967), government needs to rest on habits of conduct and 
behaviour, rather than on personal or other attachments to abstract ideals. For him, 
adaptive rules of constitutional procedure mattered. He saw ‘…politics as an 
activity in which a valuable set of tools is renovated from time to time and kept in 
trim rather than an opportunity for perpetual re-equipment.’ He remarked that 
‘…the intimations of government are to be found in ritual, not in religion or 
philosophy; in the enjoyment of ordinary peaceable behaviour, not in the search 
for truth or perfection.’ In so far as governments express utility by reference 
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exclusively to ideals and agendas of one sort or another, they give inadequate 
attention to the benefits of adaptive political culture and have rationalism lurking 
in potential.
Scruton (2003) comments on the tendency of group-think to curdle into 
repression are similarly firm. The mind-set he captures is as disturbing as any 
attacking ‘Blob’. For him, fruitful relationships depend in large measure upon 
dispassionate good humour and robust, but temperate, ridicule. In consequence, 
his critique of the flaccid language and savagery of some continental ideologues 
like Bourdieu, Zizek and Habermas is witty, and devastating. ‘The revolutionary 
spirit which searches for things to hate has found in Foucault a new literary 
formula. Look everywhere for power, he tells his readers, and you will find it. 
Where there is power there is oppression. And where there is oppression there is 
the right to destroy.’
Incidentally, Foucault echoes Marcuse (1969) who saw tolerance as everywhere 
repressive, a bulwark for class dominance and always exclusive rather than 
inclusive. Neither Scruton nor Oakeshott would accept this simplicity. Neither 
think that societies can be organised according to a superior plan or goal, or that 
there is a direction to history, or that moral and spiritual progress has teleological 
reality. They urge us to check how far the views of experts and theoreticians 
(sceptics included) shift from analysis to little more than rhetoric.
Indeed, a sceptic would not suppose that even education must have a 
‘worthwhile’ purpose defined by some expert authority. Both Scruton and 
Oakeshott follow Arendt in pressing the importance of what is neither useful nor 
necessary in education. Some things – like friendship and aesthetics – are valuable 
for their own sake and vital for personal engagement and public well-being. They 
would have no difficulty in agreeing that not everything that is measurable matters; 
in rejecting that only the measurable does; and in challenging elite meritocracy. 
Scruton simply stresses that people ‘…reason towards a common goal only in 
times of emergency when there is a threat to be vanquished or a conquest to be 
achieved. Even then, they need organisation, hierarchy, and a structure of 
command if they are to pursue their goal effectively. Nevertheless, a form of 
collective rationality does emerge in these cases, and its popular name is war.’ 
The rationalist seeks identity in combat for a cause, and cannot resist deploying 
hate in doing so.
Scruton roundly rejects such viciousness. For him, as for Oakeshott, the 
obligation to pass on and adapt natural preferences, traditions, and habits is wholly 
honourable, because they are necessary for the peaceful and successful composition 
of both present and future. Losing confidence in them leads to impotence. 
Reinterpreting the past as proof of current iniquity is invariably corrupt. Faced 
with choosing whether to ‘improve society bit by bit, or rub it out and start again’ 
(in Scruton’s language), sceptics invariably choose the former.
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For public policy, the sceptic prefers the practical - building homes, curing the 
sick, sustaining security, protecting the vulnerable, combatting poverty, and 
promoting innovation and enterprise – to instilling ‘acceptable’ attitudes. 
Departures from some required outlook will ultimately be treated as heretical or 
blasphemous, demanding reparation, self-abnegation, apology, and ostracism. 
Where puzzlement exists in the UK about any disconnection between policy and 
implementation, the sceptic will point to the tendency of modern organisations to 
require compliance with corporate values to secure instrumental and reputational 
advantage alone. This is accompanied by the introduction of high-priced leadership, 
ostensibly to overcome silo-barriers to co-operative resolution of complex problems. 
However, it also elevates a fixation with attitudinal engineering over engaging with 
the demands of professional practice and operational delivery, thus making the 
work of breaking down the barriers to resolving ‘wicked issues’ more difficult.
The sceptic will assert that the more statist and corporate an outlook; the more 
preoccupied with social justice (especially where it excludes liberty); the more 
inclined to whole-systems thinking; the more obsessed with provider as opposed 
to learner interests; and the more attached to uniformity of structure and institution, 
the more likely will be disappointment, frustration, anger, and underperformance. 
The sceptical preference is for arrangements that promote accommodations 
between both people and principles – a state that enables diverse adjustments 
rather than being the sole provider or arbiter of social and other goods. It asserts 
that some things are more important than intemperate ambition for social change.
Rationalism for both Oakeshott and Scruton, finds its ultimate expression in 
socialism, fascism, communism and some forms of nationalism, just as Arendt 
found it in totalitarianism. Their common origins lie in an impulse to see some 
actual or predicted event as demanding a total transformation of attitude and 
action. None of them contend against reason or reasonableness. They do not regard 
society and culture as necessarily inimical to either – quite the reverse. But they 
see rationalism as something appropriated by a particular adjustment to culture 
and society. It is a suffocating embrace – typified as an imperative. It is a perversion 
of virtue. In language attributed to Gramsci, it demands a long march of ideologies 
through the institutions, the better to take them over – a ‘Blob’ which attacks and 
consumes. Gove calls this out.
For his part and in considering education, Scruton reflected on the principal 
features of indoctrination (Scruton, R., Ellis-Jones, A., and O’Keefe 1985). They 
may be taken as expressive of the rationalist mind, and of the flawed expert. Spot 
them, and the mark of the ‘Blob’ may reasonably be claimed and subjected to 
legitimate interrogation and disdain. Interpolating a little, they are as follows.
• Conclusions are foregone and not subject to any serious test. The signs for this 
may be multiple – loaded questions; loaded references; and loaded vocabulary 
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in assessment and publications. This is a recurrent problem in all bad 
‘interpretivist’ research, and weak peer review.
• The conclusions form part of a ‘constellation’, whose meaning is found in a 
‘hidden unity’ based on emotional or political attitudes. In effect an inchoate 
personal or political disposition is elevated into a cause. It values manipulated 
perception, attitudinal ‘narratives’, and is hostile to reasoned challenge.
• The conclusions are premises to action, and form a fundamental starting point 
for a political ‘programme’ – ostensibly transformative, but actually 
threatening.
• The conclusions are also a part of a closed system of mutually confirming 
dogmas which serve to consolidate and validate the emotional unity from 
which it springs. The choir is permitted to sing but one song.
• Those conclusions are not established by open discussion, but by closing 
minds to alternative viewpoints, and by vilifying or denouncing opposition.
THE FUNCTIONS OF RIDICULE AND CHEERFULNESS
Ridicule and teasing in public life are functional and justifiable, where insulting 
intimidation and oppression are not. In broad terms, Arendt, Oakeshott and 
Scruton argue that the consensus, censoriousness and compliance of rationalism 
should never be permitted to supplant the contestability, civility and compromise 
implicit in reason and reasonableness. None of them would even remotely feed or 
favour conspiracy tropes; the denial of evident truth; or frantic cults of left or right. 
They would agree that peddling any claim of existential threat; of an urgent neces-
sity for total transformation; and of ultimate expert authority, has only one end – 
and it is violent. It leads to the gulag, expropriation and immiseration. For them 
all, whatever the claims of ideology or virtue they must never be allowed to 
become a secular religion policed by threats indistinguishable from charges of 
heresy and blasphemy. Thus for Oakeshott, ‘Into the heat of our engagements, into 
the passionate clash of beliefs, into our enthusiasm for saving the souls of our 
neighbours or all mankind, a government [of restraint] injects an ingredient…of 
the irony that is prepared to counteract one vice by another, of the raillery that 
deflates extravagance without itself pretending to wisdom, of the mockery that 
disperses tension, of inertia and of scepticism…. it is like the ‘governor’ which, by 
controlling the speed at which its parts move, keeps the engine from racketing 
itself to pieces.’
Giving offence through acerbic imagery is not always illegitimate. In the 
theatre of open debate, it is a kind of stage direction. It is arresting. It can prompt 
people to assess an argument’s credibility, and challenge the falsity and 
intemperateness of rationalism, in both public and private. The rituals of open 
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dialogue can be relied upon to self-correct and to moderate courteously if need be, 
when they are vigorously upheld in active engagement. By contrast a preference 
for ‘safe space’ and’ no platforming’ is invariably emblematic of the oppressor. It 
is inimical to handling risk in an inevitably uncertain world where people have 
always to face realities of potential failure, disappointment, personal harm, and 
discomfort.
Any profession worthy of the name needs to grapple with potential public 
misunderstanding about risk. It must be clear about how it is to be managed, and 
explained, on any relevant matter of public interest. It must accept the impossibility 
of its elimination. It must decide how best to communicate the practice of 
confronting multidimensional uncertainty with integrity and by sustaining openness 
(Popper 1945). Expert assessment is not necessarily proof against risk. It cannot be 
expected to be determinative when judgment anyway belongs to collective, political 
decision. Yet experts, and generalists are condemned to uneasy dialogue. It is 
sometimes incoherent and could certainly be improved: but haughty and spiky 
defensiveness about lively linguistic expression is usually no more than pompous.
At most and at best, ridicule has the capacity to puncture self-righteous 
pretentiousness and shift the focus to what is important. At the very least, it is the 
source of the kind of amusement which adds to general hilarity and cheerfulness 
in public life. There is nothing wrong with ridicule that reveals uncomfortable 
truths and when it is divorced from the motivation of the mob. The image of ‘the 
Blob’ did that – and does so still. The challenge may be irksome for some, but it 
deserves a good-humoured and careful response – something rather better than 
‘the rage of Caliban at seeing his own face in a glass’ (Wilde 1890 quoted from 
the 1992 Edn.).
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